BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//wp-events-plugin.com//7.4.12//EN BEGIN:VEVENT UID:159@chanakyauniversity.edu.in DTSTART:20260721T043000Z DTEND:20260721T073000Z DTSTAMP:20260806T103024Z URL:https://chanakyauniversity.edu.in/events/a-report-on-virtual-roundtabl e-discussion-navigating-big-power-politics-us-china-rivalry-chinas-interna l-faultlines-and-the-responses-of-india-and-taiwan/ SUMMARY:A Report on Virtual Roundtable Discussion Navigating Big-Power Pol itics US–China Rivalry\, China’s Internal Faultlines\, and the Respon ses of India and Taiwan DESCRIPTION:Webinar Report\nSubhas Chandra Bose Chair of International Rela tions (SCB of IR)\, Chanakya University\, in collaboration with Taipei Eco nomic and Cultural Centre (TECC)\, New Delhi\, organised a virtual roundta ble discussion on “Navigating Big-Power Politics: US-China Rivalry\, Chi na’s Internal Faultlines and the Responses from India and China” on 21 st July 2026. The Chair’s first international webinar brought together I ndian and Taiwanese diplomats and scholars to discuss the changing strateg ic landscape amid the US-China rivalry. Consisting of two discussion panel s\, the first panel discussed “The State of US–China Rivalry: New Equi librium or Deferred Stability?” and the second session discussed “Indi a and Taiwan Navigating the US–China Rivalry”. The discussion was atte nded by participants from Chanakya University and scholars from Indian and Taiwanese Think Tanks and Universities. \nInaugural Session\nThe opening session began with the remarks by Mr. Ashok K. Kantha\, Chair Professor\, (SCB Chair of IR)\, Chanakya University. While welcoming the new collabora tion with the TECC\, he emphasised the importance of academic engagement b etween Taiwan and India. \nHis remarks began with a discussion on the US-I ran War and how it has revealed a change in the distribution of power and how states are exercising it. His discussion delved into the following: Th e US readily deployed military force in Iran. However\, for the US\, the f ull-fledged war incurred high cost. Cost not only in terms of resources bu t also credibility\; and the outcome remains ambiguous. Iran\, for many\, has emerged or secured a relatively better strategic position in the confl ict. China remains on the sidelines and has deliberately avoided any direc t engagement or commitment. He also added that China has not yet had the l eadership capacity to manage a major global crisis.\nSecondly\, he looked into the US-China tariff war\, the truce in Busan in October 2025\, and th e Xi-Trump meeting in May. He argued that the Xi-Trump meeting has shifted the nature of engagement and balance of the rivalry\; he left the rest of the discussion to the first panel. Thirdly\, he mentioned China’s inter nal shortcomings and domestic political environment. He said that the dome stic issues constrain Beijing from emerging as a great power and left the discussion for the second panel. Fourthly\, he moved on to the Indo-Pacifi c. He said the US has not withdrawn from the Indo-Pacific. However\, altho ugh the QUAD and its objectives remain intact\, they are facing strain at the edges. To further clarify the argument\, he added the US’ intent has not changed\, but its reliability has\; primarily because of the Trump ad ministration’s increasingly transactional policies and the War in the Mi ddle East\, which has less bandwidth to sustain efforts required to manage the alliances. To set the stage for further discussion\, he raised three questions: Is the US distracted or is it losing interest in the Indo-Pacif ic? What is the future of Indo-Pacific when its principal anchor for the p ast eight years appears to be a reluctant and more transactional participa nt? Can the region absorb a degree of “de-Americanisation”?\nHe commen ted that a wholesale collapse of the American alliance system - whether NA TO or Indo-Pacific - is highly unlikely. Rather\, they will likely emerge differently\, and what is happening is not a rupture but a rebalancing.\nF inally\, he talked about China’s benefits from the current global disord er. He said that although China never favoured an alliance system similar to that of the US\, it seeks partnerships of convenience to avoid binding commitments. He also raised doubts that the stabilisation of the India-Chi na border may provide Beijing an opportunity to extract tougher concession s rather than a genuine accommodation. Besides\, the US’ transactional a pproach has pushed New Delhi to be more cautious about investing heavily i n a partnership without reliability. He said that concerns are increasing in Taiwan as it lacks an institutional alliance for a long-standing securi ty relationship. Later\, handed over the floor to Dr. Mumin Chen for his o pening remarks.\nDr. Mumin Chen from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Cent re in India\, opened his remarks by mentioning how US decline in global in fluence and China’s rise have made the strategic environment around the Taiwan issue unpredictable. \nHe discussed how US presence in the Indo-Pac ific ensured Taiwan’s security and how it is changing\, adding that Chin a is not only a major economic power but also increasingly an assertive mi litary power in the region. He said that against this backdrop\, Taiwan ha s begun preparing and adjusting foreign policy and national defence strate gy. It has invested in developing indigenous defence capabilities\, includ ing submarines and UAVs\, and an emphasis on social resilience\, ensuring that the public can respond effectively during a crisis.\nHe also pointed out that Taiwan is one of the world’s top twenty economies and a global leader in several sectors\, especially semiconductors and information tech nology. For this reason\, Taiwan’s security is not a domestic issue but concerning for the international community\, particularly neighbours such as India\, Southeast Asian countries and Japan.\nHe said that because of T aiwan’s geographical and historical closeness to China\, it has been obs erving one China and possesses greater experience and resources in underst anding developments in China.\nHe concluded his remarks by adding that Tai wan is happy to continue cooperating with India\, particularly Chanakya Un iversity\, and organise more academic programmes and events on internation al relations and China studies.\nSession I\nThe State of US–China Rivalr y: New Equilibrium or Deferred Stability?\nThe session looked at “The St ate of US-China Rivalry: New Equilibrium or Deferred Stability” covering themes such as how do India and Taiwan assess the recalibration of US-Chi na relations? Is it a present calm or a new equilibrium? How do China’s internal faultlines constrain its leadership aspirations?\nThe session was chaired by Mr. Ashok K. Kantha. The panel speakers were Mr. Manoj Kewalra mani from Takshashila Institutions in Bengaluru and Dr. Roger Chi-Feng Liu \, Director of the Integrated Diplomacy Programme\, DIMEs\, Taiwan Think T ank.\nMr. Ashok K. Kantha commenced with a discussion on the Xi-Trump summ it in May and recalibration of the US-China relations. He said that for th e first time\, the US validated China’s framework of a “constructive C hina-US relationship based on strategic stability.” However\, added that it remains uncertain what the US’ acceptance of the framework will impl y for their bilateral relations in the future.\nAfter discussing the above context\, the Chair put forward three propositions. First\, the recalibra tion between the US and China is a new equilibrium rather than a deferral of confrontation. Second\, a weakened US does not automatically translate into a stronger China. Third\, China still lacks the normative and institu tional foundations required of a genuine global superpower.\nHe concluded his remarks by saying that India and Taiwan face similar issues in the con text of this rivalry and require a balancing act. They should engage with the US\, which has become less predictable and increasingly transactional while confronting China as a security challenge. Also\, both India and Tai wan should de-risk from China without decoupling from it and deepen ties w ith the US without being a hostage to American policy.\nMr. Manoj Kewalram ani\, Takshashila Institution\, Bengaluru\, India \nMr. Manoj Kewalramani began by discussing the Xi-Trump summit. He started with the comment that many American scholars and China are overinterpreting and overstating the new framework between China and the US - a “constructive relationship of strategic stability.” The White House statement has clarified that such a framework will be based on fairness and reciprocity. Consequently\, he said that although both sides now speak of strategic stability\, the relat ionship is likely to continue experiencing considerable friction beneath t hat language.\nHis first point was that Beijing's interpretation of the fr amework should not be accepted uncritically because the structural frictio ns between the US and China remain unresolved. He pointed out the followin g: First\, China’s export of rare earths to the US remained below their average levels between 2022 and 2024 despite the Busan and Beijing agreeme nts. Second\, American security posture in the Indo-Pacific has grown stro nger. It has increased its defence expenditure\, expanded access to milita ry facilities in the Philippines and Japan’s Ryukyu Island and increased the mobility of the Marine Corps in the region. Third\, the 2026 US Natio nal Defence Strategy highlights a resilient and distributed Indo-Pacific p osture ready to respond quickly to any decisive adversary moves. He sugges ted looking beyond the rhetoric of burden-sharing and political frictions created by Trump’s diplomacy.\nHis second point discussed what these dev elopments meant for India. According to him\, the US has adopted a more ab rasive approach towards India\, and it has reduced India’s readiness to engage with the US. He also talked about India-China relations in the past 18 to 20 months\, where both sides have managed to reach greater stabilit y. However\, reminded that this opportunity is unlikely to endure indefini tely.\nHis third point was on how\, through the new framework\, China has publicly announced the competition as the defining factor of US-China rela tions. He referred to the Institute of China-America Studies\, which says that by August 2025\, Congress introduced 564 bills and regulations refere ncing China. It also implies that the strategic competition is receiving b road political support across the US.\nNext\, he delved into how India sho uld navigate the fluctuations in US-China competition. He said self-streng thening must be the anchor of Indian foreign policy. When it comes to rela tions with the US\, there shall be areas of inevitable accommodation and c oncession. However\, he said India’s approach to US policies should cont inue to be dealt with calm and patience without unquestioned acceptance of every American demand. On China\, he commented that it is a long-term sec urity and strategic challenge in the region.\nHe concluded by describing t he complex context in which the US dominates the financial architecture of the global economy\, China dominates its industrial base\, and Europe is rediscovering its strategic purpose. And that at this juncture\, India sho uld vie for more capability-driven plurilateral engagements and become a c onsequential power in selective strategic domains. \nDr. Roger Chi-Feng Li u\, Director\, Integrated Diplomacy Programme\, DIMEs Centre\, Taiwan Thin k Tank\, Taipei\, Taiwan\nDr. Roger commenced his talk with the question o f whether the recent recalibration in US-China relations suggests the re-e mergence of G2. He answered the question: US-China relations increasingly resemble the predictions made by the power transition theory\, where a ris ing power seeks to challenge the international order and the status quo po wer tries to prevent that rise using various instruments. Also\, on the Xi -Trump meeting\, he said the summit did not prompt the stock markets or cu rrency markets to react positively. It did not produce any positive outcom es for the US economy either\, and the Renminbi also failed to strengthen. Hence\, a strong G2 is increasingly unlikely\, and the summit represented a temporary deferral of confrontation\, with both sides using the pause t o advance their strategic interests.\nHe also delved into the commitments announced during the summit\, especially the proposal to establish a US-Ch ina investment commission\, a joint governance mechanism for AI\, and Chin a’s promise to purchase additional Boeing aircraft and other American pr oducts. He questioned the reality of implementation of these commitments. To understand the reality of commitments made during the summit\, he sugge sted assessing measurable indicators. He illustrated this by giving the ex ample of China’s block on the import of Nvidia’s chips as an example. Later\, China approved the import and relaxed restrictions on it\, as thes e were deemed necessary to train their advanced large language models.\nOn Taiwan\, he said that the major discussion around the summit was on the p ossible implications of the postponement of the previously promised Americ an arms sales. He added that in response\, the Taiwanese government has al ready begun implementing measures to address the consequences of the summi t. On India\, he said that the main discussion is its role in the Indo-Pac ific and the shift among the US strategic community from using “Indo-Pac ific” to “Asia-Pacific”.\nHe also talked about India’s role in QUA D and the rising debate that it has become irrelevant\, to which he differ ed. He said that minilateral mechanisms continue to be major platforms for knowledge and technology exchanges. India continues to partner with Taiwa n\, South Korea and Japan in various sectors. He said that due to these re asons\, QUAD remain important\, especially QUAD 3.0\, which focuses on eme rging technologies beyond traditional security cooperation.\nSession II\nI ndia and Taiwan Navigating the US–China Rivalry\nThe second panel sessio n was chaired by Dr. Nishit Kumar\, Assistant Professor\, Subhas Chandra B ose Chair of International Relations at Chanakya University. The Panel fea tured Mr. Santosh Pai from the Institute of Chinese Studies and Dr. Naina Singh from National Chung Hsing University (NCHU)\, Taiwan as speakers. Du ring initial remarks\, the chairperson discussed the major questions of th e panel: First\, how does New Delhi sustain strategic autonomy and differe ntiated risking\, reducing dependence on China without substituting a new dependence on the US? Secondly\, how does Taipei build resilience and cred ible deterrence and diversify beyond the US as primary security provider a s it emerges less reliable? Thirdly\, where do India and Taiwan’s intere sts converge and what scope is there for like-minded partners to coordinat e rather than face US-China rivalry alone? \nMr. Santosh Pai\, Institute o f Chinese Studies (ICS)\, New Delhi\nMr. Santosh Pai discussed practical o pportunities for strengthening India-Taiwan economic cooperation. He categ orised the opportunities into: diversification\, de-risking\, integration\ , and expansion.\nOn diversification\, he talked about Taiwan’s role in helping India reduce its dependence on China through alternative sources o f imports. He said that India has recently increased its imports of integr ated circuits\, printed circuit boards and chemicals from Taiwan and that it has helped India reduce its dependence on Chinese supply chains. 

 On de-risking\, he suggested focusing on areas where Taiwan has replaced C hina as the major supplier. \n\nOn integration\, he said that Taiwan’s i nvestments in India increased after 2020 in three broad groups: trust-base d investments in semiconductors\, integration into supply chains\, and lab our-intensive manufacturing. He said that India’s emergence as a major e xporter of Apple smartphones is supported by over USD 1 billion in Taiwane se support and that this template can be replicated in other sectors. He s aid that one of the major policy challenges for India is integrating Taiwa n’s supply chains into India’s network of free trade agreements. He al so suggested expanding India-Taiwan cooperation to sectors where India alr eady possesses a competitive base but requires technological upgrading\, s uch as technical textiles.\nHe also suggested making use of joint ventures \, mergers and acquisitions with Indian firms to facilitate technology tra nsfer\, modernise domestic industry and align with India’s policy of loc alising manufacturing.\nOn expansion\, he has said that current Taiwanese investment in India is highly concentrated in Tamil Nadu and that similar industrial ecosystems can be developed in other Indian states by adopting Tamil Nadu’s policies.\nHe concluded by pointing out that in the domain of trade\, investments and technology\, can both sides get creative and in stead explore fostering industrial partnerships which has the support of r egulators from both sides.\nDr. Naina Singh\, National Chung Hsing Univers ity (NCHU)\, Taichung\, Taiwan\nDr. Naina Singh shared her observations ba sed on her six years of experience in Taiwan. She focused on the question: How is Taiwan building resilience\, strengthening credible deterrence and diversifying beyond the “silicon shield” when it relies on external a ctors for security\, whose reliability is increasingly questioned?\nShe st arted her session by briefing the concept of the silicon shield and its ch allenges. She explained that the traditional argument of the silicon shiel d\, where Taiwan’s dominance in the semiconductor industry discourages m ilitary action against the country\, has become less certain. Because the US has been pursuing semiconductor diversification through several initiat ives\, such as the CHIPS Act\, to strengthen domestic manufacturing capaci ty. She added that the US’ successful diversification and replacing Taiw an Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s efficiency will reduce the stra tegic incentive for the US to provide security in the event of a conflict with China.\nShe added that China’s progress in the semiconductor indust ry and AI is a challenge to the silicon shield. She mentioned how during t he 2026 World AI Summit\, Shanghai demonstrated China’s technological ca pacity and the growth and potential to surpass Taiwan in advanced semicond uctor production. She said that it implied a decreasing value of Taiwan’ s semiconductor dominance as a deterrence.\nShe said that Taiwan\, in resp onse\, has begun strengthening domestic resilience in other sectors\, espe cially institutionalisation of an asymmetric defence strategy. She referre d to Taiwan’s 2025 quadrennial defence review\, which talks about multi- domain deterrence inclusive of cyberattacks\, disinformation campaigns\, d amage to critical infrastructure and disruptions to submarine communicatio n cables. The objective is to keep pace with Chinese military capacities t hrough maximising asymmetric advantages. She also mentioned that Taiwan ha s invested heavily in indigenous missile systems\, domestic defence indust ries and unmanned systems by adopting lessons from the Ukraine war.\nDomes tically\, she said that Taiwan has invested heavily in its security prepar edness by reforming military service and reserve forces. She mentioned tha t military training currently includes operational use of drones and techn ologies. She also talked about the societal approach to resilience\, inclu ding awareness\, defence exhibitions\, community-level preparedness\, psyc hological preparedness\, social cohesion\, infrastructure production\, eco nomic continuity and civil defence. She added that national-level resilien ce exercises are being conducted on a regular basis\, and these drills inc luded simulated disruptions on telecommunication networks and emergency pr ocedures and evacuation protocols.\nShe concluded by commenting that Taiwa n’s evolving concept of resilience is beyond military deterrence and it reflects a strategy of national survival under uncertain security conditio ns.\nDiscussion\nThe webinar was followed by an interesting discussion rev olving around the following themes:\n\n\n \nIndia’s capacity to become a consequential power in raw materials\, AI supply chain\, and technology talent\n\n \nChina’s deepening defence cooperation with countries like Pakistan and its reluctance to provide broader security guarantees\n\n \n Potential for building components for drones between India and Taiwan\, es pecially through joint partnerships\n\n \nTaiwan’s concerted efforts to build resilience against cyber-attacks.\n\n\n(The report is prepared by M s. Anu Maria Joseph\, Non-Resident Fellow at Subhas Chandra Bose Chair of International Relations at Chanakya University\, Bengaluru) ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://chanakyauniversity.edu.in/wp-content/upl oads/2026/08/Image-for-Webinar-report.jpg CATEGORIES:CU events,Subash Chandra Bose Chair END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR